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1 Introduction
An affirmative answer was the conclusion of ‘Can computers make judicial de-
cisions?’, the inaugurative speech with which Jaap van den Herik accepted his
professorship in AI and Law in Leiden. This happened more than 15 years ago.
In the meantime, the same question has appeared on a regular basis as the cen-
tre of a debate about the opportunities offered by computers in legal domains.
This article addresses the question whether computer can make judicial decisions
from a desirability viewpoint: what happens to legal certainty and equality of
rights if computers would make judicial decisions? Van den Herik claims that
both would increase. But before I address whether this is the case, the ambiguity
of Van den Herik’s main question needs to be reduced.
The ambiguities in the question are made more apparent if we dissect the
question in three parts: the parts ‘can’, ‘computers’ and ‘make judicial decisions’.
The ambiguity starts in the verb ‘can’, which implies either an ability or a right.
The same ambiguity appears in the question ‘can I steal’. Obviously I could steal
if I wanted to (as I have my arms and legs and can go to a store and put a piece
of French cheese in the pocket of my coat). However, the normative reading of
‘can’ under most circumstances implies that I cannot — that is: may not —
steal.
The word ‘computers’ seems to imply that the activity can be attributed
entirely to the machine. However, the computer as we know it, and most software
that is currently used, is written by human beings, and acts in ways which are,
for the larger part at least, predictable by the same persons that program them.
Van den Herik’s main question thus leaves open what part of responsibility for
the activity is left to computers, and which part to human beings or institutions.
The phrase ‘make judicial decisions’ in the question suggests that the activity
is rather unequivocal — that making judicial decisions means the same across
legal systems, across legal domains such as civil law and penal law, and across
different cases. It does not. Not only because civil law and common law systems
are rather different, but also because deciding about whether a person should
pay a parking ticket is something quite different from deciding the case for two
civil parties in a complex tort case.
Analyzing the main question in this manner implies that we have to reduce
the scope of the question elements in order to prevent a multiplication of ac-
tual questions. In this article, I will focus on one particular element that is
almost completely left out of consideration in the original inaugurative speech:
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is it desirable that computers make judicial decisions? I will analyze this ques-
tion according to the notion of ‘virtual straitjackets’ that I first introduced in
Mommers (2006) and that I will elaborate upon in this article. The term ‘virtual
straitjacket’, I should state, is rather new, but the underlying concept is indebted
to the notion of ‘code is law’ developed by Lessig (1999), for his recognition that
programming computers is a normative activity. In brief, I will argue that using
computers in the process of judicial decision making — even if their role is only
supportive in nature — is very likely to introduce virtual straitjackets.
2 Virtual straitjackets
Everyone has had their own experiences with forms lacking proper categories
and voice response systems leading you through endless series of selections. I
call these ‘virtual straitjackets’, and they are becoming ever more ubiquitous. A
virtual straitjacket is a situation characterized by the following:
(a) The situation consists of ‘forcing’ individuals into options that do not offer
the choice they prefer.
(b) The situation is based on previously made choices with respect to classifica-
tion schemes.
(c) The situation is ‘virtual’, in the sense that the option offered is not a physical
one.
Although this sounds highly abstract, it can be made concrete very easily.
For instance, handwritten notes will not be read if you put them on a computer-
readable form, so that your comments about that form cannot be processed.
And web forms may contain questions that do not allow you to provide a proper
answer, by offering only a limited number of options and not providing an option
’other, please specify’. Although they are not necessary for their occurrence,
Information and communication technologies tend to trigger virtual straitjackets
because automating processes requires making explicit distinctions in order to
avoid manual classification work. We are not conscious any more of many virtual
straitjackets, simply because we are adjusted to particular classifications. But
even the seemingly simple classification male/female may actually exclude people
who do not have a clear gender. Physically-oriented situations, such as having to
choose a particular cash register in a supermarket, fall outside the scope of this;
’virtual’ means that the options do not directly involve physical consequences.
Virtual straitjackets occur more and more often in the legal domain. This
is, assumedly, a consequence of the call for efficiency of legal aid and processing
capacity. Automation is still often the answer to this efficiency call. Addition-
ally, the use of information and communication technologies in law increases
because they are used in normal activities such as word processing and infor-
mation access, but also in essential parts of procedures, such as the use of video
connections for hearings. The most obvious example of a virtual straitjacket in
law I came across was noted by Dory Reiling, a judge of the Amsterdam court.
She was ‘corrected’ by an employee who said: “Your Honor, you cannot impose
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that sanction, Compas [the administrative system for the Dutch judiciary - LM]
cannot process it!” (Reiling 2005). This ‘Unwertung aller Werte’ is a fundamental
threat to judicial independence and discretionary powers.
3 Virtualization of Judicial Decision Making
To indicate the way in which technological developments may affect judicial
decision making and introduce virtual straitjackets, I discuss the changes that
occur within four functional areas: administrative processes, forms of communi-
cation, accessibility of information and services, and assessment of information
and services. I leave out (potential) benefits of such technologies — which do of
course exist. For these benefits, I refer to Mommers (2005), in which I gave an
overview of the potential consequences of virtualization for dispute resolution in
these four functional areas.
Administrative processes have traditionally been substantially affected by
the introduction of information and communications technology. This is also
valid for ICT within judicial institutions. Within this functional area, we find
technology for, e.g., the registration of information about specific cases and the
parties involved. Such information systems often contain virtual straitjackets,
but they need not directly affect the way in which judicial decisions are made.
In case, however, the judiciary itself is forced to use the administrative systems
in the primary process, they may easily involve virtual straitjackets concerning,
e.g., imposing sanctions and storing case information. Especially if information
systems are shared by the judiciary and the public prosecutor, there is a danger
of the public prosecutor implicitly imposing norms on the judiciary.
Under the heading of forms of communication, several developments can be
distinguished. New forms of communication are developed, such as e-mail, chat,
and internet forums, changing the way in which people interact. For instance,
interaction can have various forms between synchronous and asynchronous com-
munication, meaning that persons may exchange their ideas immediately, or
think a short while about them. The traditional division between telephone and
mail has turned into a continuum, featuring chat applications, voice-mail, in-
ternet forums and e-mail. With the introduction of these new communications
means, people are much less dependent on specific locations and points in time
to be able to interact. Virtual straitjackets may occur here in the same manner
as they occur in corporate communication, and increasingly in government com-
munication: web forms and e-mail management systems that often do not lead to
proper answers to a question, but to frustration on the customers’ side. Causes
for such frustration may consist of spam filters that do not let normal e-mail
pass and systems that lead e-mails to the wrong persons in an organization.
Accessibility of information and services has experienced a profound change
due to the introduction of information and communication technologies. The
transition from paper to screen has resulted in a vast amount of possibilities to
rearrange bits and pieces of information in order to facilitate access, for instance
through the use of hypertext. Accessibility of information also benefits from
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being able to search the whole text instead of only a selected number of keywords,
and being able to search very fast through large numbers of documents. The
downside of this is that portals and other information services may contain
limitations on accessibility not known to their users, e.g. because of the use of
certain search technologies. Often, search results are taken for granted, and users
do not even realize that they have encountered a virtual straitjacket preventing
them from getting access to the right information.
Assessment of information and services can change considerably as a result
of the introduction of information and communication technology. The dimin-
ishing of personal contact may lead to a different assessment of, for instance,
interpersonal communication. The assessment may become more focused on its
content (cf. Mommers 2003). As an opposite effect, this distance may also lead
to indifference, apathy, or to swiftly escalating arguments (which often occur in,
for instance, on-line forums and mailing lists, and even in normal e-mail corre-
spondence). Computer-based assessment systems are often very simple and do
not leave room for nuance, thus introducing new virtual straitjackets. Although
they can be very useful for a quick evaluation of the quality of a piece of infor-
mation or a service, details are left out, thereby potentially giving a distorted
picture of the object of assessment.
4 Virtual Straitjackets and Judicial Decision Making
The debate on Van den Herik’s inaugurative speech has been often of a heated
nature: some people tend to react rather agressively to the suggestion that a
computer can make judicial decisions, and thus replace a judge. Still, it is mostly
a matter of assigning competences: although it is common practice to assign
competences and responsibilities to institutions, officially doing so to computers
is a major taboo. In practice, however, in all too many cases, responsibilities are
shifted to information systems. This could mean, for instance, that call center
representatives do not only not want to connect you to their manager, but that
they are not able to do so. Their computer-based telephone systems simply do
not allow them to.
There is an unmistakable tendency to accept such virtual straitjackets as
facts of life. Their consequences may vary from rather innocent nuisances to se-
vere repercussions for the opportunities to assign responsibility and blame. In
case of the judiciary, this would include a violation of the separation of pow-
ers introduced by Montesquieu (1748) — although Montesquieu himself might
consider using computers an ideal situation, as it would represent a possibility
to make a (computer) judge into the ‘bouche de la loi’. Today’s jurisprudence,
however, does not consider this a realistic image of judicial decision making.
The role of information systems in general and in the judiciary in specific
has been subject of legal literature. Consider, for instance, Franken’s (1993)
introduction of general principles for proper ICT-use, and the principles Van den
Hoogen (2007) introduces in his Ph.D. thesis, aimed specifically at ’electronic
judicial decision making’. Both authors introduce normative principles which
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ICT systems should comply with. However, the dangers associated with the use
of ICT cannot be prevented by drafting principles only. With respect to virtual
straitjackets, the principles should be able to address this danger. Franken’s
flexibility principle addresses this issue, whereas within the sixteen principles
Van den Hoogen distinguishes, I have not been able to identify one of these
as addressing the danger of virtual straitjackets, except — maybe — for the
principle that responsibility is assigned to judges.
What are, then, the concrete dangers of virtual straitjackets to judicial deci-
sion making? In the previous section, I have listed potential virtual straitjackets
in four functional areas. But the core of judicial decision making is, in my opin-
ion, the freedom of judges to make a decision according to their own appraisal
of facts and rules. Any use of computers in the decision making process imposes
a (potential) danger of limiting that freedom by offering only ‘programmed’ op-
tions. This will prove undesirable in many cases. Although legal certainty and
equality of rights may benefit from such virtual straitjackets, these values have
to be weighed against other ones, such as judicial independence and fair trial.
We return to the end of Van den Herik’s inaugurative speech, where he claims
that computers can make judicial decisions in certain areas of law. This was as
true back then as it is now — if computers are attributed the ‘power’ to make
those decisions. Not much has changed since then on the issue of the modelling
effort needed to make computers fit for their judicial decision-making task. A lot
has changed, however, in the use of information and communication technology
in the judiciary. Therefore, the debate on the question ‘can computers make
judicial decisions?’ should be shifted to a new question ‘which roles of computers
in the judiciary are desirable, and which are not?’.
5 So, Now, Then...
As a personal note, I should say that my answer to the main question of Van
den Herik’s inaugurative speech used to change on an hourly basis. I have always
sympathized with the affirmative as well as the negative answers to the question.
The fact that it is so ambiguous in nature could explain that attitude. However,
the most prominent danger is not that computers make judicial decisions, but
that information systems prescribe how judges should make judicial decisions.
First, independence of individual judges is one of the backbones of Western legal
systems. Second, behind information systems, there are often powers outside the
judiciary itself, thus crossing the border between powers which, ideally, should
be separated.
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